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In this paper, we introduce a lightweight dynamic epistemic logical framework for automated plan-
ning under initial uncertainty. We reduce plan verification and conformant planning to model check-
ing problems of our logic. We show that the model checking problem of the iteration-free fragment
is PSPACE-complete. By using two non-standard (but equivalent) semantics, we give novel model
checking algorithms to the full language and the iteration-free language.
1 Introduction
Conformant planning is the problem of finding a linear plan (a sequence of action) to achieve a goal in
presence of uncertainty about the initial state (cf. [29]). For example, suppose that you are a rookie spy
trapped in a foreign hotel with the following map at hand:1
s6 s7:Safe s8:Safe
s1 r // s2 r //
u
OO
s3 r //
u
OO
s4:Safe r //
u
OO
s5
Now somebody spots you and sets up the alarm. In this case you need to move fast to one of the safe
hiding places marked in the map (i.e., s7,s8 and s4). However, since you were in panic, you lost your way
and you are not sure whether you are at s2 or s3 (denoted by the circle in the above graph). Now what
should you do in order to reach a safe place quickly? Clearly, merely moving r or moving u may not
guarantee your safety given the uncertainty. A simple plan is to move r first and then u, since this plan
will take you to a safe place, no matter where you actually are initially. This plan is conformant since it
does not require any feedback during the execution and it should work in presence of uncertainty about
the initial state. More generally, a conformant plan should also work given actions with non-deterministic
effects. Such a conformant plan is crucial when there are no feedbacks/observations available during the
execution of the plan.2 Note that since no information is provided during the execution, the conformant
plan is simply a finite sequence of actions without any conditional moves.
∗Corresponding author
1It is a variant of the running example in [33].
2In many other cases, feedbacks may be just too ‘expensive’ to obtain during a plan aiming for quick actions [8].
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As discussed in [9, 25], conformant planning can be reduced to classical planning, the planning
problem without any initial uncertainty, over the space of belief states. Intuitively, a belief state is a
subset of the state space, which records the uncertainty during the execution of a plan, e.g., {s2,s3} is
an initial belief state in the above example. In order to make sure a goal is achieved eventually, it is
crucial to track the transitions of belief states during the execution of the plan, and this may traverse
exponentially many belief states in the size of the original state space. As one may expect, conformant
planning is computationally harder than classical planning. The complexity of checking the existence of
a conformant plan is EXPSPACE-complete in the size of the variables generating the state space [19]. In
the literature, people proposed compact and implicit representations of the belief spaces, such as OBDD
[13, 15, 14] and CNF [31], and different heuristics are used to guide the search for a plan, e.g., [11, 12].
Besides the traditional AI approaches, we can also take an epistemic-logical perspective on planning
in presence of initial uncertainties, based on dynamic epistemic logic (DEL) (cf. e.g., [16]). The central
philosophy of DEL takes the meaning of an action as the change it brings to the knowledge of the agents.
Intuitively, this is what we need to track the belief states during the execution of a plan3. Indeed, in recent
years, there has been a growing interest in using DEL to handle multi-agent planning with knowledge
goals (cf. e.g., [7, 24, 2, 3, 34, 26]), while the traditional AI planning focuses on the single-agent case.
In particular, the event models of DEL (cf. [6]) are used to handle non-public actions that may cause
different knowledge updates to different agents. In these DEL-based planning frameworks, states are
epistemic models, actions are event models and the state transitions are implicitly encoded by the update
product which computes a new epistemic model based on an epistemic model and an event model.
One advantage of this approach is its expressiveness in handling scenarios which require reason-
ing about agents’ higher-order knowledge about each other in presence of partially observable actions.
However, this expressiveness comes at a price, as shown in [7, 4], that multi-agent epistemic planning is
undecidable in general. Many interesting decidable fragments are found in the literature [7, 24, 34, 1],
which suggests that the single-agent cases and restrictions on the form of event models are the key to
decidability. However, if we focus on the single-agent planning, a natural question arises: how do we
compare such DEL approaches with the traditional AI planning? It seems that the DEL-based approaches
are more suitable for planning with actions that change (higher-order) knowledge rather than planning
with fact-changing actions, although the latter type of actions can also be handled in DEL. Moreover,
the standard models of DEL are purely epistemic thus do not encode the temporal information of avail-
able actions directly. This may limit the applicability of such approaches to planning problems based on
transition systems.
In this paper, we tackle the standard single-agent conformant planning problem over transition sys-
tems, by using the core idea of DEL, but not its standard formalism. Our formal framework is based on
the logic proposed by Wang and Li in [33], where the model is simply a transition system with initial
uncertainty as in the motivating example, and an action is interpreted in the semantics as an update on
the uncertainty of the agent. Our contributions are summarized as follows:
• A lightweight dynamic epistemic framework with a simple language and a complete axiomatiza-
tion.
• Non-trivial reduction of conformant planning to a model checking problem using our language
with programs.
3Here the belief states are actually about knowledge in epistemic logic.
300 A Dynamic Epistemic Framework for Conformant Planning
• Two novel model checking algorithms based on two alternative semantics for the proposed logic,
which make the context-dependency in the original semantics explicit.
• The complexity of model checking the iteration-free fragment of our language is PSPACE-complete.
The model checking problem of the full language is in EXPTIME. The model checking problem
of the conformant planning is in PSPACE.
The last result may sound contradictory to the aforementioned result that the complexity of confor-
mant planning is EXPSPACE-complete. Actually, the apparent contradiction is due to the fact that the
EXPSPACE complexity result is based on the number of state variables which require an exponential
blow up to generate an explicit transition system that we use here. We will come back to this issue at the
end of Section 4.3.
Our approach has the following advantages compared to the existing planning approaches:
• The planning goals can be specified as arbitrary formulas in an epistemic language. Extra plan
constraints (e.g., what actions to use) can be expressed explicitly by programs in the language.
Therefore it may cover a richer class of (conformant) planning problems compared to the tradi-
tional AI approach where a goal is Boolean.4
• The plans can be specified as regular expressions with tests in terms of arbitrary EPDL formulas,
which generalizes the knowledge-based programs in [18, 22].
• By reducing conformant planning to a model checking problem in an explicit logical language,
we also see the subtleties hidden in the planning problem. In principle, there are various model
checking techniques to be applied to conformant planning based on this reduction.
• Our logical language and models are very simple compared to the standard action-model based
DEL approach, yet we can encode the externally given executability of the actions in the model,
inspired by epistemic temporal logic (ETL) [17, 27].
• Our approach is flexible enough to provide, in the future, a unified platform to compare different
planning problems under uncertainty. By studying different fragments of the logical language and
model classes, we may categorize planning problems according to their complexity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: We introduce our basic logical framework and its
axiomatization in Section 2, and extend it in Section 3 with programs to handle the conformant planning.
The complexity analysis of the model checking problems is in Section 4 and we conclude in Section 5
with future directions.
2 Basic framework
2.1 Epistemic action language
To talk about the knowledge of the agent during an execution of a plan, we use the following language
proposed in [33].
4The goal in the standard conformant planning is simply a set of different valuations of basic propositional variables. Our
approach can even handle epistemic goals in negative forms, e.g., we want to make sure the agent knows something but does
not know too much in the end.
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Definition 2.1 (Epistemic Action Language (EAL)) Given a countable set A of action symbols and a
countable set P of atomic proposition letters , the language EALAP is defined as follows:
5
φ ::=> | p | ¬φ | (φ ∧φ) | [a]φ | Kφ ,
where p∈ P, a∈ A. The following standard abbreviations are used: ⊥ :=¬>, φ∨ψ :=¬(¬φ∧¬ψ),φ→
ψ := ¬φ ∨ψ,〈a〉φ := ¬[a]¬φ , Kˆφ := ¬K¬φ .
Kφ says that the agent knows that φ , and [a]φ expresses that if the agent can move forward by action
a, then after doing a, φ holds. Throughout the paper, we fix some P and A, and refer to EALAP by EAL.
The size of EAL-formulas (notation |ϕ|) is defined inductively: |>| = |p| = 1; |¬φ | = 1+ |φ |; |φ ∧
ψ| = 1+ |φ |+ |ψ|; |Kφ | = |[a]φ | = 1+ |φ |. The set of subformulas of φ ∈ EAL, denoted as sub(φ), is
defined as usual.
Definition 2.2 (Uncertainty map) Given P and A, a (multimodal) Kripke modelN is a tuple 〈S ,{Ra |
a ∈ A},V 〉, where S is a non-empty set of states, Ra ⊆ S ×S is a binary relation labelled by a,
V :S → 2P is a valuation function. An uncertainty map M is a Kripke model 〈S ,{Ra | a ∈ A},V 〉
with a non-empty set U ⊆ S . Given an uncertainty map M , we refer to its components by SM ,
RaM , VM , and UM . A pointed uncertainty mapM ,s is an uncertainty mapM with a designated state
s ∈UM . We write s a→ t for (s, t) ∈Ra.
Intuitively, a Kripke model encodes a map (transition system) and the uncertainty set U encodes the
uncertainty that the agent has about where he is in the map. The graph mentioned at the beginning of
the introduction is a typical example of an uncertainty map. Note that there may be non-deterministic
transitions in the model, i.e., there may be t1 6= t2 such that s a→ t1 and s a→ t2 for some s, t1, t2.
Remark 1 It is crucial to notice that the designated state in a pointed uncertainty map must be one of
the states in the uncertainty set.
Definition 2.3 (Semantics) Given any uncertainty map M = 〈S ,{Ra | a ∈ A},V ,U 〉 and any state
s ∈U , the semantics is defined as follows:
M ,s > always
M ,s  p ⇐⇒ s ∈ V (p)
M ,s  ¬φ ⇐⇒ M ,s 2 φ
M ,s  φ ∧ψ ⇐⇒ M ,s  φ andM ,s  ψ
M ,s  [a]φ ⇐⇒ ∀t ∈ S : s a→ t impliesM |a, t  φ
M ,s  Kφ ⇐⇒ ∀u ∈U :M ,u  φ
where M |a = 〈S ,{Ra | a ∈ A},V ,U |a〉 and U |a = {r′ | ∃r ∈U such that r a→ r′}. We say φ is valid
(notation:  φ ) if it is true on all the pointed uncertainty maps. For a action sequence σ = a1 . . .an, we
write U |σ for (. . .((U |a1)|a2) . . .)|an . and writeM |σ for (. . .((M |a1)|a2) . . .)|an .
Intuitively, the agent ‘carries’ the uncertainty set with him when moving forward and obtains a new
uncertainty set U |a. Note that here we differ from [33] where the updated uncertainty set is further
5We do need unboundedly many action symbols to encode the desired problem in the later discussion of model checking
complexity.
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refined according to what the agent can observe at the new state. For conformant planning, we do not
consider the observational power of the agent during the execution of a plan.
Let us call the model mentioned in the introduction M , it is not hard to see that M |r and (M |r)|u
are as follows:
s6 s7:Safe s8:Safe
s1 r // s2 r //
u
OO
s3 r //
u
OO
s4:Safe r //
u
OO
s5
s6 s7:Safe s8:Safe
s1 r // s2 r //
u
OO
s3 r //
u
OO
s4:Safe r //
u
OO
s5
Thus we have:
• M ,s3  [r](Safe∧¬KSafe)
• M ,s3  K[r][u](Safe∧KSafe)
The usual global model checking algorithm for modal logics labels the states with the subformulas
that are true on the states. However, this cannot work here since the truth value of epistemic formulas
on the states outside U is simply undefined. Moreover, the exact truth value of an epistemic formula on
a state depends on ‘how you get there’, as the following example shows (the underlined states mark the
actual states):
s1 b //
a

s3 : p
a

s2
a
<<
s4
b→
s1 b //
a

s3 : p
a

s2
a
<<
s4
s1 b //
a

s3 : p
a

s2
a
<<
s4
a→ a→
s1 b //
a

s3 : p
a

s2
a
<<
s4
Let the left-hand-side model be M then it is clear that M |b,s3  K p while M |aa,s3 2 K p thus
M ,s1  〈b〉K p∧〈a〉〈a〉¬K p. This shows that the truth value of an epistemic subformula w.r.t. a state in
the model is somehow ‘context-dependent’, which requires new techniques in model checking. We will
make this explicit in Section 4.3 when we discuss the model checking algorithm.
2.2 Axiomatization
Following the axioms proposed in [33], we give the following axiomatization for EALw.r.t. our semantics:
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System SELA
Axioms Rules
TAUT all axioms of propositional logic MP
φ ,φ → ψ
ψ
DISTK K(p→ q)→ (K p→ Kq) NECK φ
Kφ
DIST(a) [a](p→ q)→ ([a]p→ [a]q) NEC(a) φ
[a]φ
T K p→ p SUB φ(p)
φ(ψ)
4 K p→ KK p
5 ¬K p→ K¬K p
PR(a) K[a]p→ [a]K p
NM(a) 〈a〉K p→ K[a]p
where a ranges over A, p,q range over P. PR(·) and NM(·) denote the axioms of perfect recall and no
miracles respectively (cf. [32]).
Note that since we do not assume that the agent can observe the available actions, the axiom OBS(a) :
K〈a〉>∨K¬〈a〉> in [33] is abandoned. Due to the same reason, the axiom of no miracles is also simpli-
fied.
We show the completeness of SELA using a more direct proof strategy compared to the one used in
[33].
Theorem 2.1 SELA is sound and strongly complete w.r.t. EAL on uncertainty maps.
Proof: To prove that SELA is sound on uncertainty maps, we need to show that all the axioms are valid
and all the inference rules preserve validity. Since the uncertainty set in an UM denotes an equivalent
class, axioms T, 4 and 5 are valid; due to the semantics, the validity of axioms PR(·) and NM(·) can be
proved step by step; others can be proved as usual.
To prove that SELA is strongly complete on uncertainty maps, we only need to show that every
SELA-consistent set of formulas is satisfiable on some uncertainty map. The proof idea is that we
construct an uncertainty map consisting of maximal SELA-consistent sets (MCSs), and then with the
Lindenbaum-like lemma that every SELA-consistent set of formulas can be extended in to a MCS (we
omit the proof here), we only need to prove that every formula holds on the MCS to which it belongs.
Firstly, we construct a canonical Kripke modelN c = 〈S c,{Rca | a ∈ A},V c〉 as follows:
• S c is the set of all MCSs;
• sRcat ⇐⇒ 〈a〉φ ∈ s for any φ ∈ t (equivalently φ ∈ t for any [a]φ ∈ s);
• V c(p) = {s | p ∈ s}.
Given s ∈S c, we define U cs = {u ∈S c | Kφ ∈ s iff Kφ ∈ u}, and it is obvious that s ∈U cs . Thus we
have that for each s ∈S c, M cs = 〈N c,U cs 〉 is an uncertainty map, and M cs ,s is a pointed uncertainty
map.
Secondly, we prove the following claim.
Claim 2.1 If s a→ t, then we have U cs |a =U ct .
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⊆: Assuming v ∈ U cs |a, we need to show v ∈ U ct , namely we need to show that Kφ ∈ v ⇐⇒ Kφ ∈ t.
Since v ∈ U cs |a, we have that there is u ∈ U cs such that uRcav. If Kφ ∈ t, it follows by axiom 4 that
KKφ ∈ t. Thus we have 〈a〉KKφ ∈ s. By axiom NM(a), it follows that K[a]Kφ ∈ s. By u∈U cs and axiom
T, we have [a]Kφ ∈ u. It follows by uRcav that Kφ ∈ v. If Kφ 6∈ t, we have ¬Kφ ∈ t. By axiom 5, we
have K¬Kφ ∈ t. Similarly, we have ¬Kφ ∈ v. Thus we have Kφ 6∈ v.
⊇: Assuming v ∈U ct , we need to show v ∈U cs |a, namely there is u ∈U cs such that uRcav. Let u− be
{Kφ | Kφ ∈ s}∪{〈a〉ψ | ψ ∈ v}. Then u− is consistent. For suppose not, we have ` Kφ1∧ ·· ·∧Kφn→
[a]¬ψ1∨ ·· ·∨ [a]¬ψk for some n and k. Since ` [a]¬ψ1∨ ·· ·∨ [a]¬ψk→ [a](¬ψ1∨ ·· ·∨¬ψk), we have
` Kφ1 ∧ ·· · ∧Kφn → [a](¬ψ1 ∨ ·· · ∨¬ψk). By rule NECK and axiom DISTK, we have ` KKφ1 ∧ ·· · ∧
KKφn→ K[a](¬ψ1∨·· ·∨¬ψk). Since KKφi ∈ s for each 1≤ i≤ n, we have K[a](¬ψ1∨·· ·∨¬ψk) ∈ s.
By axiom PR(a), it follows that [a]K(¬ψ1∨·· ·∨¬ψk)∈ s. It follows by sRcat that K(¬ψ1∨·· ·∨¬ψk)∈ t.
Since v ∈U ct , by axiom T, we have ¬ψ1∨·· ·∨¬ψk ∈ v. This is contrary with ψi ∈ v for each 1≤ i≤ k.
Thus u− is consistent. By Lindenbaum-like Lemma, there exists a MCS u extending u−. It follows by
u− ⊆ u that u ∈U cs and uRcav. We conclude that v ∈U cs |a.
Finally, we will show that M cs ,s  φ iff φ ∈ s. we prove it by induction on φ . Please note that the
‘existence lemmas’ (that ¬[a]φ ∈ s implies ¬φ ∈ t for some t such that s a→ t and that ¬Kφ ∈ s implies
¬φ ∈ s′ for some s′ ∈U cs ) also hold in the modelN c. We only focus on the case of [a]φ . With Claim 2.1,
it follows that M ct =M
c
s |a if s a→ t. Then by the induction hypothesis and the existence lemmas, it is
easy to show thatM cs ,s  [a]φ iff [a]φ ∈ s.
3 An extension of EAL for conformant planning
3.1 Epistemic PDL over uncertainty maps
In this section we extend the language of EAL with programs in propositional dynamic logic and use this
extended language to express the existence of a conformant plan.
Definition 3.1 (Epistemic PDL) The Epistemic PDL Language (EPDL) is defined as follows:
φ ::=> | p | ¬φ | (φ ∧φ) | [pi]φ | Kφ
pi ::= a | ?φ | (pi;pi) | (pi+pi) | pi∗
where p ∈ P, a ∈ A. We use LpiMφ to denote [pi]φ ∧〈pi〉φ , which is logically equivalent to [pi]φ ∧〈pi〉>.
Given a finite B⊆ A, we write B∗ for (Σa∈Ba)∗, i.e., the iteration over the ‘sum’ of all the action symbols in
B. The size of EPDL formulas/programs is given by: |[pi]φ |= |pi|+ |φ |, |a|= 1, |pi1;pi2|= 1+ |pi1|+ |pi2|,
|?φ |= |pi∗|= 1+ |φ |, and |pi1+pi2|= 1+ |pi1|+ |pi2|.
Given any uncertainty mapM = 〈S ,{Ra | a ∈ A},V ,U 〉, any state s ∈U , the semantics is given
by a mutual induction on φ and pi (we only show the case about [pi]φ , other cases are as in EAL):
M ,s  [pi]φ⇔ for allM ′,s′ : (M ,s)JpiK(M ′,s′)
impliesM ′,s′  φ
(M ,s)JaK(M ′,s′)⇔M ′ =M |a and s a→ s′
(M ,s)J?ψK(M ′,s′)⇔ (M ′,s′) = (M ,s) andM ,s  ψ
(M ,s)Jpi1;pi2K(M ′,s′)⇔ (M ,s)Jpi1K◦ Jpi2K(M ′,s′)
(M ,s)Jpi1+pi2K(M ′,s′)⇔ (M ,s)Jpi1K∪ Jpi2K(M ′,s′)
(M ,s)Jpi∗K(M ′,s′)⇔ (M ,s)JpiK?(M ′,s′)
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where ◦,∪, ? at the right-hand side denote the usual composition, union and reflexive transitive closure
of binary relations respectively. Clearly this semantics coincides with the semantics of EAL on EAL
formulas.
Note that each program pi can be viewed as a set of computation sequences, which are sequences of
actions in A and tests with φ ∈ EPDL:
L (a) = {a}
L (?φ) = {?φ}
L (pi;pi ′) = {ση | σ ∈L (pi) and η ∈L (pi ′)}
L (pi+pi ′) =L (pi)∪L (pi ′)
L (pi∗) = {ε}∪⋃n>0(L (pi · · ·pi︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
)) where ε is the empty sequence
Here are some valid formulas which are useful in our latter discussion:
〈pi;pi ′〉φ ↔ 〈pi〉〈pi ′〉φ
[pi+pi ′]φ ↔ [pi]φ ∧ [pi ′]φ
[?ψ]φ ↔ (ψ → φ )
We leave the complete axiomatization of EPDL on uncertainty maps to future work.
3.2 Conformant planning via model checking EPDL
Definition 3.2 (Conformant planning) Given an uncertainty mapM , a goal formula φ ∈ EPDL, and a
set B⊆ A, the conformant planning problem is to find a finite (possibly empty) sequence σ = a1a2 · · ·an ∈
L (B∗) such that for each u ∈UM we haveM ,u  La1MLa2M · · ·LanMφ . The existence problem of confor-
mant planning is to test whether such a sequence exists.
Recall that LpiMφ is the shorthand of [pi]φ ∧〈pi〉φ . Intuitively, we want a plan which is both executable
and safe w.r.t. non-deterministic actions and initial uncertainty of the agent. It is crucial to observe the
difference between La1MLa2M · · ·LanMφ and La1;a2; · · · ;anMφ by the following example:
Example 1 Given uncertainty mapM depicted as follows, we haveM ,s1  La;bMp butM ,s1 2 LaMLbMp.
s2 b // s4 : p
s1
a
66
a (( s3
GivenM and φ , to verify whether σ ∈L (pi) is a conformant plan can be formulated as the model
checking problem: M ,uKLa1MLa2M · · ·LanMφ . On the other hand, the existence problem of a conformant
plan is more complicated to formulate: it asks whether there exists a σ ∈ L (B∗) such that it can be
verified as a conformant plan. The simple-minded attempt would be to check whether M ,u  K〈B∗〉φ
holds. Despite the 〈·〉-vs.-L·M distinction, K〈B∗〉φ may hold on a model where the sequences to guarantee
φ on different states in UM are different, as the following example shows:
Example 2 Given uncertainty mapM depicted as follows, let the goal formula be p and B= {a,b}. We
haveM ,s1  K〈B∗〉p, but there is no solution to this conformant planning problem.
s1 a // s3 b // s5 : p
s2 b // s4 a // s6 : p
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The right formula to check for the existence of a conformant plan w.r.t. B⊆ A and φ ∈ EPDL is:
θB,φ = 〈(Σa∈B(?K〈a〉>;a))∗〉Kφ .
For example, if B = {a1,a2} then θB,φ = 〈((?K〈a1〉>;a1)+ (?K〈a2〉>;a2))∗〉Kφ . Intuitively, the confr-
mant plan consists of actions that are always executable given the uncertainty of the agent (guaranteed
by the guard K〈a〉>). In the end the plan should also make sure that φ must hold given the uncertainty
of the agent (guaranteed by Kφ ). In the following, we will prove that this formula is indeed correct.
First, we observe that the rule of substitution of equivalents is valid (φ(ψ/χ) is obtained by replacing
any occurrence of χ by ψ , similar for Jpi(ψ/χ)K):
Proposition 3.1 If  ψ ↔ χ , then:
(1)  φ ↔ φ(ψ/χ);
(2) JpiK= Jpi(ψ/χ)K.
Proposition 3.2  KLaMφ ↔ 〈?K〈a〉>;a〉Kφ
Proof: Since  KLaMφ ↔ (K[a]φ ∧K〈a〉φ) and  (K〈a〉>∧〈a〉Kφ)↔ 〈?K〈a〉>;a〉Kφ , we only need to
show that  (K[a]φ ∧K〈a〉φ)↔ (K〈a〉>∧〈a〉Kφ).
Left to right:
(L1)  K[a]φ → [a]Kφ , by validity of Axiom PR(a)
(L2)  K〈a〉φ → 〈a〉>∧K〈a〉>, by semantics
(L3)  〈a〉>∧ [a]Kφ → 〈a〉Kφ , by semantics
(L4)  K[a]φ ∧K〈a〉φ → K〈a〉>∧〈a〉Kφ , by (L1)-(L3)
Right to left:
(R1)  〈a〉Kφ → K[a]φ , by validity of Axiom NM(a)
(R2)  K[a]φ ∧K〈a〉>→ K〈a〉φ , by semantics
(R3)  K〈a〉>∧〈a〉Kφ → K[a]φ ∧K〈a〉φ , by R(1)-R(2)
Lemma 3.1 For any a1a2 · · ·an ∈L (A∗):
 KLa1MLa2M · · ·LanMφ ↔ 〈?K〈a1〉>;a1; . . . ; ?K〈an〉>;an〉Kφ
Proof: It is trivial when n= 0 (i.e., the sequence is ε), since the claim then boils down to Kφ ↔ Kφ . We
prove the non-trivial cases by induction on n≥ 1. When n = 1, it follows from Proposition 3.2. Now, as
the induction hypothesis, we assume that:
 KLa1MLa2M · · ·LakMφ ↔ 〈?K〈a1〉>;a1; . . . ; ?K〈ak〉>;ak〉Kφ .
We need to show:
KLa1MLa2M · · ·Lak+1Mφ ↔ 〈?K〈a1〉>;a1; . . . ; ?K〈ak+1〉>;ak+1〉Kφ .
By IH,
KLa1MLa2M · · ·Lak+1Mφ ↔ 〈?K〈a1〉>;a1; . . . ; ?K〈ak〉>;ak〉KLak+1Mφ . (1)
Due to Propositions 3.1 and 3.2, we have:
〈?K〈a1〉>;a1; . . . ; ?K〈ak〉>;ak〉KLak+1Mφ ↔ 〈?K〈a1〉>;a1; . . . ; ?K〈an〉>;ak〉〈?K〈ak+1〉>;ak+1〉Kφ . (2)
The conclusion is immediate by combining (1) and (2).
The following theorem follows from the above lemma.
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Theorem 3.1 Given a pointed uncertainty mapM ,s, an EPDL formula φ and a set B⊆ A, the following
two are equivalent:
(1) There is a σ = a1 . . .an ∈L (B∗) such thatM ,s  KLa1MLa2M · · ·LanMφ ;
(2) M ,s  〈(Σa∈B(?K〈a〉>;a))∗〉Kφ .
We would like to emphasise that the K operator right before φ in the definition of θB,φ cannot be
omitted, as demonstrated by the following example:
Example 3 Given uncertainty map M depicted as follows, let the goal formula be p. As we can see,
there is no solution to this conformant planning problem. IndeedM ,s1 2 〈(Σa∈B(?K〈a〉>;a))∗〉K p with
B= {a,b}, but we could haveM ,s1  〈(Σa∈B(?K〈a〉>;a))∗〉p.
s1 a // s2 b //
b
""
s5 : p
s4
We close this section with an example about planning with both positive and negative epistemic goals
(the agent should know something, but not too much).
Example 4 Given uncertainty map M depicted as follows, let the goal be K p then both a and b are
conformant plans. If the goal is K p∧¬Kq, only a is a good plan.
s1 a //
b
&&
s3 : p
s2
a //
b
&&
s4 : p,q
s5 : p,q
4 Model checking EPDL: complexity and algorithms
In this section, we first focus on the model checking problem of the following star-free fragment of EPDL
(call it EPDL−):
φ ::=> | p | ¬φ | (φ ∧φ) | [pi]φ | Kφ
pi ::= a | ?φ | (pi;pi) | (pi+pi)
We will show that model checking EPDL− is PSPACE-complete. In particular, the upper bound is shown
by making use of an alternative context-dependent semantics. Then we give an EXPTIME algorithm
for the model checking problem of the full EPDL inspired by another alternative semantics based on 2-
dimensional models. Finally we give a PSPACE algorithm for the conformant planning problem in EPDL.
Note that throughout this section, we focus on uncertainty maps with finitely many states and assume
Ra = /0 for co-finitely many a ∈ A.
4.1 Complexity of model checking EPDL−
4.1.1 Lower Bound
To show the PSPACE lower bound, we provide a polynomial reduction of QBF (quantified Boolean for-
mula) truth testing to the model checking problem of EPDL−. Note that to determine whether a given
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QBF (even in prenex normal form based on a conjunctive normal form) is true or not is known to be
PSPACE-complete [30]. Our method is inspired by [28] which discusses the complexity of model check-
ing temporal logics with past operators. Surprisingly, we can use the uncertainty sets to encode the ‘past’
and use the dual of the knowledge operator to ‘go back’ to the past. This intuitive idea will become more
clear in the proof.
QBF formulas are Q1x1Q2x2 . . .Qnxnφ(x1, . . . ,xn) where:
• For 1≤ n≤ n,Qi is ∃ if i is odd, and Qi is ∀ if i is even.
• φ is a propositional formula in CNF based on variables x1, . . . ,xn,
For each such QBF α with n variables, we need to find a pointed model Mn,x0 and a formula θα
such that α is true iffMn,x0  θα . The modelMn is defined below.
Definition 4.1 Let A= {ai, a¯i | i≥ 1} and P= {pk,qk | k≥ 1}, the uncertainty mapMn = 〈S ,{Ra | a∈
A},V ,U 〉 is defined as:
• S = {x0}∪{xi | 1≤ i≤ n}∪{x¯i | 1≤ i≤ n}
• V (x0) = /0, and V (xi) = {pi},V (x¯i) = {qi} for 1≤ i≤ n.
• ai→= {(s,s) | s ∈S }∪{(xi−1,xi),(x¯i−1,xi)}
• a¯i→= {(s,s) | s ∈S }∪{(xi−1, x¯i),(x¯i−1, x¯i)}
• U = {x0}
|Mn| is linear in n and can be depicted as the following:
x1 : p1
A
 a2 //
a¯2

x2 : p2
A
 a3 //
a¯3

· · · xn−1 : pn−1
A
 an //
a¯n
  
xn : pn
A

x0
A

a1
::
a¯1 ##
x¯1 : q1
A
WW a¯2
//
a2
AA
x¯2 : q2
A
WW a¯3
//
a3
DD
· · · x¯n−1 : pn−1
A
WW a¯n
//
an
>>
x¯n : qn
A
WW
Given α = Q1x1Q2x2 . . .Qnxnφ(x1, . . . ,xn), the formula θα is defined as
QT1 · · ·QTnψ(Kˆ p1, · · · , Kˆ pn, Kˆq1, · · · , Kˆqn)
where QTi is 〈(ai+ a¯i); ?(pi∨qi)〉 if i is odd and QTi is [(ai+ a¯i); ?(pi∨qi)] if i is even, and ψ is obtained
from φ(x1, . . . ,xn) by replacing each xi with Kˆ pi and ¬xi with Kˆqi.
To ease the latter proof, we first define the valuation tree below.
Definition 4.2 (V-tree) A V-tree τ is a rooted tree such that 1) each node is 0 or 1 (except the root ε); 2)
each internal node in an even level has only one successor; 3) each internal node in an odd level has two
successors: one is 0 and the other one is 1; 4) each edge to node 0 of level i is labelled a¯i; 5) each edge
to node 1 of level i is labelled ai. Given a V-tree with depth n, a path σ is a sequence of A1 . . .An where
Ai = ai or Ai = a¯i. A path σ can also be seen as a valuation assignment for x1, . . . ,xn with the convention
that σ(xi) = 1 if ai occurs in σ and σ(xi) = 0 if a¯i occurs in σ . Let path(τ) be the set of all paths of τ .
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As an example, a V-tree τ can be depicted as below:
ε a1 // 1
a¯2 ))
a2
55
0 a3 //
1 a¯3 //
1
0
It is not hard to see the following:
Proposition 4.1 For each 1≤ i≤ n, we have: α = Q1x1 . . .QixiQi+1xi+1 . . .Qnxnφ is true iff there exists
a V-tree τ with depth i such that for each σ ∈ path(τ) σ(Qi+1xi+1 . . .Qnxnφ) = 1 (σ as a valuation).
Now let us see the update result of running a path σ ∈ path(τ) onMn. Due to the lack of space, we omit
the proofs of the following two propositions.
Proposition 4.2 Given Mn, let σ = A1 . . .Ai (1 ≤ i ≤ n) be a sequence of actions such that Ak = ak or
Ak = a¯k for each 1 ≤ k ≤ i, then we have U |σ = {x0,X1, . . . ,Xi} where Xk = xk if Ak = ak else Xk = x¯k
for each 1≤ k ≤ i.
Given σ = A1 . . .An where Ai is ai or a¯i for each 1≤ i≤ n, let g(σ) = xn if An = an and g(σ) = x¯n if
An = a¯n. By Proposition 4.2, we always have g(σ)∈UMk |σ with k > n. Thus givenMk and σ =A1 . . .An
and k > n,Mk|σ ,g(σ) is a pointed uncertainty map.
Proposition 4.3 For each 1≤ i≤ n, we haveMk,x0 QT1 . . .QTiQTi+1 . . .QTnψ iff there exists a V-tree
τ with depth i such thatMk|σ ,g(σ) QTi+1 . . .QTnψ for each σ ∈ path(τ), where k > n and g(σ) is the
state corresponds to the last edge of σ , e.g., g(a1a¯2) = x¯2.
Theorem 4.1 The following two are equivalent:
• α = Q1x1Q2x2 . . .Qnxnφ(x1, . . . ,xn) is true
• Mn,x0  QT1 · · ·QTnψ(Kˆ p1 · · · Kˆ pn, Kˆq1 · · · Kˆqn) in which ψ is obtained from φ by replacing each
xi with Kˆ pi and ¬xi with Kˆqi.
Proof: By Propositions 4.1 and 4.3, we only need to show that given V-tree τ with depth n, σ(φ) = 1
if and only if Mn|σ ,g(σ)  ψ for each σ ∈ path(τ). Since φ is in CNF, ψ is also in CNF-like form
obtained by replacing each xi with Kˆ pi and each ¬xi with Kˆqi for 1≤ i≤ n. Thus we only need to show
that σ(xi)= 1 iffMn|σ ,g(σ) Kˆ pi and σ(¬xi)= 1 iffMn|σ ,g(σ) Kˆqi. Since σ(xi)= 1 iff σ(¬xi)= 0,
we only need to show that σ(xi) = 1 iffMn|σ ,g(σ)  Kˆ pi andMn|σ ,g(σ)  Kˆ pi iffMn|σ ,g(σ) ¬Kˆqi.
By the definition of τ , we know that σ = A1 . . .An where Ai is ai or a¯i for each 1≤ i≤ n.
Firstly, we will show that Mn|σ ,g(σ)  Kˆ pi if and only if Mn|σ ,g(σ)  ¬Kˆqi. To verify the right-
to-left direction, if Mn|σ ,g(σ)  Kˆ pi, it follows by the definition of Mn that xi ∈ U |σ . Then it must
be the case that ai occurs in σ . Suppose not, a¯i occurs in σ . It follows by Proposition 4.2, U |σ =
{x0,X1, . . . ,Xi−1, x¯i,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn}. This is contrary with xi ∈ U |σ . Thus it must be that ai occurs in
σ . It follows by Proposition 4.2 that U |σ = {x0,X1, . . . ,Xi−1,xi,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn}. Thus x¯i 6∈ U |σ . By the
definition of Mn and the semantics, we have Mn|σ ,g(σ)  ¬Kˆqi. To verify the left-to-right direction,
Mn|σ ,g(σ)  ¬Kˆqi implies that x¯i 6∈ U |σ . For the similar reason as above, it must be the case that a¯i
does not occur in σ . Thus we have that ai occurs in σ . It follows by Proposition 4.2 that xi ∈U |σ . Thus
we haveMn|σ ,g(σ)  Kˆ pi.
Next we will show that σ(xi)= 1 iffMn|σ ,g(σ) Kˆ pi. To verify the right-to-left direction, σ(xi)= 1
implies that Ai = ai. It follows by Proposition 4.2 that xi ∈ U |σ . Thus we have Mn|σ ,g(σ)  Kˆ pi. To
verify the left-to-right direction, we will show that σ(xi) = 0 implies Mn|σ ,g(σ)  Kˆqi. It follows by
the definition of σ(xi) = 0 that Ai = a¯i. It follows by Proposition 4.2 that x¯i ∈ U |σ . Thus we have
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Mn|σ ,g(σ)  Kˆqi.
This gives us the desired lower bound:
Theorem 4.2 The model checking problem for EPDL− is PSPACE-hard.
4.1.2 Upper Bound
In this section we give a non-trivial model checking algorithm for EPDL− inspired by an equivalent
semantics.
As we mentioned earlier, the semantics of EPDL is ‘context-dependent’: reaching the same state
through different paths may affect the truth value of an epistemic subformula. This means that the usual
global model checking algorithm for modal logics may not work here. In order to establish the upper
bound, we first give the following equivalent semantics to EPDL− which makes the context dependency
explicit in order to facilitate a local model checking algorithm. The idea is to keep the model intact
but record the scope of action modalities in order to compute the right uncertainty set for epistemic
subformulas. Similar idea appeared in [32] to give an alternative semantics of public announcement
logic.
Definition 4.3 Given an uncertainty map M = 〈S ,{Ra | a ∈ A},V ,U 〉 and any state s ∈ S , the
satisfaction relation  is defined using the auxiliary satisfaction relation σ and auxiliary relation
ωσ→,
where σ is a finite (possibly empty) sequence of actions in A:
M ,s  φ ⇔M ,s ε φ
M ,s σ > ⇔ always
M ,s σ p ⇔ p ∈ V (s)
M ,s σ ¬φ ⇔M ,s 1σ φ
M ,s σ φ ∧ψ⇔M ,s σ φ andM ,s σ ψ
M ,s σ Kφ ⇔ for all v ∈U |σ :M ,v σ φ
M ,s σ 〈pi〉φ ⇔ there exists ω ∈L (pi) and t ∈S
such that s
ωσ→ t andM , t σr(ω) φ
s
εσ→ t ⇔ s = t
s
(aω ′)σ→ t ⇔ there exists s′ such that s a→ s′ and s′
ω ′(σa)→ t
s
(?φω ′)σ→ t ⇔M ,s σ φ and s ω
′
σ→ t
where r(ω) is the sequence of actions obtained by eliminating all the tests in ω .
Note that ω in the above definition is a computation sequence, i.e., a finite sequence of actions and
EPDL−-tests, while σ is a test-free sequence of actions.
The following can be proved by induction on η :
Proposition 4.4 Given an uncertainty map M and sequences of actions and tests η ,ω,ω ′ such that
η = ωω ′, we have (s, t) ∈ησ→ iff (s, t) ∈ωσ→◦
ω ′σr(ω)→ for any sequence of actions σ .
Proof: We prove it by induction on |η |. If |η | ≤ 2, it is obvious by the definition. If |η | > 2, there are
two cases, that is, η = aη ′ or η =?φη ′.
Case η = aη ′ : We have ω = aω ′′ for some initial segment ω ′′ of η ′, and (s, t) ∈(aη
′)σ→ iff there exists
s′ such that s a→ s′ and (s′, t) ∈η
′
σa→. By IH, we have η
′
σa→=ω
′′
σa→ ◦
ω ′σar(ω ′′)→ . Thus we have (s′, t) ∈η
′
σa→ iff there
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exists t ′ such that (s′, t ′) ∈ω
′′
σa→ and (t ′, t) ∈
ω ′σar(ω ′′)→ . By definition, we have that s a→ s′ and (s′, t ′) ∈ω
′′
σa→ iff
(s, t ′) ∈aω
′′
σ→ . Thus we have (s, t) ∈aω
′′
σ→ ◦
ω ′σar(ω ′′)→ , namely (s, t) ∈ωσ→◦
ω ′σr(ω)→ .
Case η =?φη ′ : We have ω =?φω ′′ for some initial segment ω ′′ of η ′, and (s, t) ∈(?φη
′)σ→ iffM ,sσ
φ and s
η ′σ→ t. By IH, we have s η
′
σ→ t iff (s, t) ∈ω
′′
σ→ ◦
ω ′σr(ω ′′)→ . Thus we have there exists s′ such that
(s,s′) ∈ω
′′
σ→ and (s′, t) ∈
ω ′σr(ω ′′)→ . This follows that (s,s′) ∈(?φω
′′)σ→ , and (s, t) ∈(?φω
′′)σ→ ◦
ω ′σr(?φω ′′)→ , namely
(s, t) ∈ωσ→◦
ω ′σr(ω)→ .
In the following we show that  coincides with .
Theorem 4.3 Given an uncertainty map M and an action sequence σ , if U |σ 6= /0, we have that for
each s ∈U |σ ,
(i) M |σ ,sJpiKM ′,s′ iff there exists ω ∈L (pi) such thatM ′ =M |σr(ω) and s ωσ→ s′,
(ii) M |σ ,s  φ iffM ,s σ φ .
Proof: The proof is by simultaneous induction on pi and φ (due to the test actions). For (i), we will only
focus on the case of pi1;pi2; the other cases are straightforward.
Case pi1;pi2: We only show the direction from left to right; the other direction is similar. It follows by
assumption that there is pointed uncertainty map N , t such that M |σ ,sJpi1KN , t and N , tJpi2KM ′,s′.
By IH, we have that there exists ω ∈L (pi1) such thatN =M |σr(ω) and s ωσ→ t. SinceN , t is a pointed
uncertainty map andN =M |σr(ω), we have t ∈U |σr(ω). By IH andM |σr(ω), tJpi2KM ′,s′, we have that
there exists ω ′ ∈L (pi2) such thatM |σr(ω)r(ω ′) =M |σr(ωω ′) =M ′ and t
ω ′σr(ω)→ s′. By Proposition 4.4, it
follows that ωω ′ ∈L (pi1;pi2) and s (ωω
′)σ→ s′.
For (ii), we will focus on the case of 〈pi〉φ ; the other cases are straightforward.
Case 〈pi〉φ : We haveM |σ ,s  〈pi〉φ if and only if there is pointed uncertainty mapM ′,s′ such that
M |σ ,sJpiKM ′,s′ andM ′,s′  φ . By (i), it follows thatM |σ ,sJpiKM ′,s′ iff there exists ω ∈L (pi) such
thatM ′ =M |σr(ω) and s ωσ→ s′. By IH, it follows thatM |σr(ω),s′  φ iffM ,s′ σr(ω) φ . Thus we have
M ,s  〈pi〉φ .
Let σ be ε , we have the equivalence of  and .
Corollary 4.1 Given pointed uncertainty mapM ,s, we haveM ,s  φ iffM ,s φ for each φ ∈ EPDL−.
This alternative semantics induces a natural algorithm to compute the truth value of an EPDL− for-
mula w.r.t. to a pointed uncertainty map. The idea is to recursively call a function MC(M ,s,σ ,φ) which
returns the truth value of a subformula φ on state s given the context of σ while keepingM intact. Note
that, we do not need to compute all the MC(M ,s,σ ,φ) for each σ and each subformula φ . The only
tricky part comes when evaluating 〈pi〉φ formulas since it is too space consuming to compute the whole
set of L (pi) in the search of the right ω . Instead, we can generate one by one in some lexicographical
order all the possible sequences up to a bound based on the atomic actions and tests occurring in the
formula, and then test whether it belongs to the program pi . Note that in this way, we can use the space
repeatedly, and the membership testing ofL (pi) is not expensive (NLOGSPACE-complete according to
[20]).
In the appendix we present three algorithms based on matrix representation of the model: Algo-
rithm 1 computes the uncertainty setU |σ ; Algorithm 2 computes wσ→ and Algorithm 3 is the main model
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checking algorithm. Note that Algorithms 2 and 3 involve mutual recursion of each other due to the
tests in programs. However, the depth of the recursion is bounded by the length of the formula, and for
each call polynomial space suffices. The detailed algorithms and complexity analysis can be found in the
appendix. It is not hard to show the following (based on Theorem 4.2)
Theorem 4.4 (Upper bound) The model checking problem of EPDL− is in PSPACE. Thus it is PSPACE-
complete.
4.2 Upper Bounds for model checking EPDL
In this section, we give an EXPTIME model checking method for the full EPDL via model checking EPDL
over two-dimensional models with both epistemic and action relations. Let us first define such models.
Definition 4.4 (Epistemic Temporal Structure) An Epistemic Temporal Structure (ETS) is a Kripke
model with both epistemic and action relations. Formally, an ETS model M is a tuple 〈S ,{Ra | a ∈
A},∼,V 〉, where Ra is a binary relation on S , ∼ is an equivalence relation on S and V :S → 2P is
a valuation function.
Now we define an alternative semantics of EPDL over ETSs.6
Definition 4.5 (ETS Semantics) Given any ETS
modelM= 〈S ,{Ra | a ∈ A},∼,V 〉 and any state s ∈S , the satisfaction relation for EPDL formulas is
defined as follows (the Boolean cases are as in the standard modal logic):
M,s  Kφ ⇔∀u ∈S : s∼ u impliesM,u  φ
M,s  [pi]φ⇔∀t ∈ S : s pi→ t impliesM, t  φ
a→ = Ra
?φ→ = {(s,s) |M,s  φ}
pi1;pi2→ = pi1→◦ pi2→
pi1+pi2→ = pi1→∪ pi2→
pi∗→ = ( pi→)?
where ◦,∪, ? at right-hand side denote the usual composition, union and reflexive transitive closure of
binary relations respectively.
We can turn a Kripke model without the epistemic relation into an ETS model by essentially consid-
ering all the possible uncertainty sets.
Definition 4.6 Given any Kripke model M = 〈S ,{Ra | a ∈ A},V 〉, we define the ETS model M • as
follows:
S • = {sΓ | s ∈S ,Γ ∈ 2S ,s ∈ Γ}
R•a = {(sΓ, t∆) | s a→ t,∆= Γ|a}
∼• = {(sΓ, t∆) | Γ= ∆}
V •(sΓ) =V (s)
where Γ|a = {t ∈S | ∃s ∈ Γ such that s a→ t}. For any Kripke modelM and any Γ ∈ 2S \{ /0}, letM Γ
be the uncertainty map 〈M ,Γ〉.
6Here we abuse the notation  to denote the new semantics. Note that it is different from the alternative semantics in the
previous section.
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Note that each sΓ can be viewed as an uncertainty set (Γ) with a designated state (s), and the definition
ofRa captures the update in the  semantics of EPDL, andM • unravels all the updates in a whole picture.
Note that the size ofM • is |S | ·2|S |−1 whereS is the set of states ofM .
Now we can show that  and  coincide w.r.t. uncertainty mapM Γ and ETS modelM • (the proofs
are omitted due to the lack of space).
Proposition 4.5 Given any mapM , we have
(i) M Γ,sJpiKM ∆, t iff sΓ pi→ t∆ inM •;7
(ii) M Γ,s  φ iffM •,sΓ  φ .
Corollary 4.2 Given an uncertainty mapM = 〈N ,U 〉 and s ∈U , we haveM ,s  φ iffN •,sU  φ .
Based on the above corollary we can have a model checking method via model checking EPDL over ETS
models.
Proposition 4.6 The model checking problem of EPDL on uncertainty maps is in EXPTIME.
Proof: Given an uncertainty mapM = 〈N ,U 〉, the construction of ETSN • can be done in exponen-
tial time in the size of N due to the fact that there are at most |N | a-successors t∆ of each sΓ since
∆= Γ|a. By modifying the algorithm for PDL in [23], we can get an algorithm to check EPDL formula φ
onN • w.r.t., and its time complexity is O(|φ |2 · |N •|3). Thus, the time complexity of model checking
φ onM is bounded by O(|φ |2 · |SN |3 ·23|SN |−3).
We conjecture that the model checking problem of full EPDL is EXPTIME-complete, and leave the
lower bound to the extended version of this paper.
4.3 Complexity of conformant planning
In the rest of this section, let us look at the complexity of conformant planning in terms of EPDL model
checking. Although the model checking problem of full EPDL is likely to be EXPTIME-complete, the
complexity of model checking the EPDL formula which encodes the conformant planning problem (cf.
Theorem 3.1) is in PSPACE if the goal formula is program-free. More precisely, we can show the follow-
ing:
Theorem 4.5 The problem of model checking EPDL formulas in the shape of 〈(Σa∈B(?K〈a〉>;a))∗〉Kφ ,
where φ is an epistemic formula (i.e. program-free) and B⊆ A, is in PSPACE.
Proof: (Sketch) Note that (∑a∈B(?K〈a〉>;a))∗ is a special program which has only simple epistemic
tests depending on the structure of the underlying Kripke model. Now given a Kripke model N and a
set B ⊆ A we can define an ETS model N ◦ similar to N • but with a different definition for the action
relations:
R◦a = {(sΓ, t∆) | s a→ t,∆= Γ|a,∀u ∈ Γ∃v st. u a→ v.}
Note that the extra condition guarantees that the action a is always executable w.r.t. the whole Γ,
thus fulfilling the test ?K〈a〉>. Now we can have an analog of Corollary 4.2, and reduce the problem
of checking 〈N ,U 〉,s  (∑a∈B(?K〈a〉>;a))∗Kφ to the reachability problem in N ◦: whether there is
a path from sU in N ◦ such that it can reach a state tU ′ where Kφ holds. Since φ is [pi]-free, we can
check it easily given U ′ using polynomial space, thus the main task is to find the reachable tU ′ . Note
7Cf. the definition of pi→ in Def. 4.5.
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that, in the size ofN , there are exponentially many such tU ′ and the maximal length of the plan is also
exponential. However, we do not need to build the whole N ◦ and the bisection-like algorithm behind
the proof of Savitch’s Theorem will do the job.8 More precisely, we first pick up a tU ′ , and then run
the recursive bisection method to see whether tU ′ is reachable from sU within 2|N | steps. The depth
of the recursion is bounded by log2(2|N |) = |N | and at each recursion we need to record the choice of
the state which can be encoded by a (0,1)-vector using log2(2|N |) = |N | space (plus one bit to record
the result). Moreover, at the bottom of the recursion we only need to verify one step reachability, i.e.,
whether two states inN ◦ are linked byR◦a , without building the wholeN ◦. Thus the whole procedure
of model checking can be done using polynomial space.
As we mentioned in the introduction, the conformant planning problems in the AI literature are
usually given by using state variables and actions with preconditions and (conditional) effects, rather than
explicit transition systems. The corresponding explicit transition system can be generated by taking all
the possible valuations of the state variables as the state space (an exponential blow up), and computing
the transitions among the valuations according to the preconditions and the postconditions of the actions.
In terms of the size of explicit transition systems, our above result is consistent with the EXPSPACE
complexity result in the AI literature for conformant planning with Boolean and modal goals [21, 8].
Actually, the complexity result of Theorem 4.5 can be strengthened to PSPACE-complete based on the
corresponding complexity result in the AI literature.
However, not all the transition systems can be generated in this way since the preconditions and
postconditions are (usually) purely propositional and thus two states that share the same valuation must
have the same executable actions. In an arbitrary transition system, multiple states with the same valua-
tion may have different available actions due to some underlying protocol or other (external) factors not
modelled by basic propositions.
5 Conclusions and future work
In this work we first introduce the logical language EAL over uncertainty maps and axiomatize it com-
pletely. EAL is then extended to EPDL with programs to specify conformant and conditional plans. We
show that the conformant planning problems can be reduced to model checking problems of EPDL. Fi-
nally we showed that model checking star-free EPDL over uncertainty maps is PSPACE-complete and
model checking the full fragment is in EXPTIME. On the other hand, model checking the conformant
planning problem is in PSPACE.
Note that our EPDL is a powerful language which can already express conditional plans, for example,
(?p;a+?¬p;b);c. This suggests that we can use the very EPDL language (EPDL− is enough) to verify
plans in contingent planning w.r.t. a variant of the semantics which can handle feedbacks during the
execution. In fact, observational power about the availability of the actions has been already incorporated
in [33], which can be extended to general feedbacks discussed in the literature of contingent planning
(cf. e.g., [10]). On the other hand, to check the existence of a conditional plan, we are not sure whether
EPDL is expressive enough, as subtleties may arise as in the case of conformant planning. We leave the
contingent planning to future work.
Another natural extension is to go probabilistic, and reduce the probabilistic planning over MDP
to some model checking problem of the probabilistic version of our EPDL. Our ultimate goal is to cast
all the standard AI planning problems into one unified logical framework in order to facilitate careful
8A similar algorithm was used to pinpoint complexity of the conformant planning in AI, cf.[21].
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comparison and categorization. We will then see clearly how the form of the goal formula, the constructor
of the plan, and the observational ability matter in the theoretical and practical complexity of planning,
in line with the research pioneered in [5].
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A Algorithms for EPDL−
Definition A.1 (Matrix representation) Let Bn×m denote a (0,1)-matrix of size n×m. A matrix Bn×1, or
Bn for short, is called a vector. Given finite uncertainty mapM , its domainS can be linearly ordered as
{s1, · · · ,sn}. ThusM can be represented by a set {Ban×n | a ∈ A} of adjacency matrices for accessibility
relation, a vector BUn for U and a set {B pn | p ∈ P} of vectors for atomic propositions.
Definition A.2 Given (0,1)-matrices B′n×k,Bk×m, their product B
′′
n×m is defined as: B′′n×m[i, j] = 1 iff there
exists r ≤ n such that B′n×k[i,r] = Bk×m[r, j] = 1 for all 1≤ i≤ n,1≤ j ≤ m.
The following algorithms are to check whether φ holds on a pointed uncertainty mapM ,s by Definition
4.3. The main algorithm (Algorithm 3) recursively calls itself for each non-trivial subformula of φ .
The complex cases are for the subformulas in the form of 〈pi〉φ and Kφ . By Definition 4.3, to check
M ,s σ 〈pi〉φ , we need to make sure that there exists a sequence ω ∈L (pi) and a state t ∈S such that
s
ωσ→ t and M , t σr(ω) φ . Since pi is star-free, |ω| ≤ |pi| for each ω ∈L (pi). It is clear that we cannot
compute and store the whole set of L (pi) within polynomial space. Instead, one by one we generate all
the possible sequences that are shorter than |pi| and are formed from the alphabet of pi (cf. line 14), and
check whether they are inL (pi). We can order the possible sequences lexicographically according to an
ordering of the basic actions and tests in Sig, and compute the next sequence merely from the current one
using function next. memb chec(ω,pi) checks whether it is the case ω ∈L (pi). If ω ∈L (pi), we need
to check whether there exists s j ∈SM such that s ωσ→ s j (Algorithm 2) andM ,s j σr(ω) φ , where r(ω)
is the test-free subsequence of ω which is easy to compute. For the case of Kφ , we need to calculate the
state set U |σ (Algorithm 1).
B Complexity analysis
We suppose |SM |= n and |φ |= k. Algorithm 1 uses one variable A to record the uncertainty set which
requires O(n) space. Note that there is a mutual recursion in Algorithm 2 and 3, but the depth of the
overall recursion is bounded by k. In Algorithm 2, the variable consuming the most of the space is the
matrix Bn×n recording the (intermediate) relation. Since σ and ω are also variables in the main algorithm
and |ω|+ |σ | ≤ k due to the construction in Algorithm 3, the space usage of Algorithm 2 before the
recursive calls of PW and MC is bounded by O(k+n2). For Algorithm 3, the most space-demanding part
is the 〈pi〉φ case, where we need to store pi , Sig, and keep track oneω and one state s in the loop, which are
bounded by either k or s. Moreover, according to [20], the complexity of memb chec is NLOGSPACE-
complete in the size of Sig, i.e., the alphabet of pi which is bounded again by k. Thus before calling
MC and PW again in the 〈pi〉φ case, the space requirement is at most linear in both k and n, which is
less demanding than PW for each recursion. Recall that the overall recursion depth of MC (and PW ) is
bounded by k thus the space usage of the whole algorithm is bounded by O(k(k+n2)) = O(k2+ kn2).
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Algorithm 1: Function CNU(U ,σ): Calculate the the new uncertainty set U |σ
input : U , σ
output: BU |
σ
n
1 A← BUn ;
2 for i← 1 to |σ | do
3 A← A×Bσ [i]n×n;
4 return A;
Algorithm 2: Function PW (ω,σ): Calculate the binary relation ωσ→
input : computation sequence ω , action sequence σ
output: Bn×n
1 switch ωσ do
2 case εσ return Matrix({(s,s) | s ∈S }) /* Matrix(R) is the (0,1)-matrix
representation of the binary relation R */;
3 case (?φω ′)σ return Matrix({(s,s) |MC(M ,s,σ ,φ) = true })× PW(ω ′,σ ) ;
4 case (aω ′)σ return Ban×n× PW(ω ′,σa) ;
Algorithm 3: Function MC(M ,s,σ ,φ): Model checking algorithm for EPDL− (Boolean cases
omitted)
input : The pointed uncertainty map (M ,s), sequence of actions σ , φ ∈ EPDL−.
output: true ifM ,s σ φ .
1 switch φ do
2 case 〈pi〉ϕ
3 Let Sig be the array consisting of atomic programs and formulas in pi ordered according to
their first appearances;
4 ω ← Sig[1] /* ω is the candidate sequence we want to test */;
5 while |ω| ≤ |pi| do
6 if memb chec(ω,pi) then
7 for i = 1 toSM do
8 if (s,si) ∈ PW (ω,σ) then
9 if MC(M ,s j,σr(ω),ϕ) then return true ;
10 ω ← next(ω,Sig) /* calculate the next sequence lexicographically
according to the order Sig */;
11 return false;
12 case Kϕ
13 B
U |σ
n = CNU(U ,σ) /* calculate the vector representation of U |σ */
14 for m = 1 to |SM | do
15 if (BU |
σ
n )m = 1 and MC(M ,sm,σ ,ϕ) = false then return false ;
16 return true;
